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JUDICIAL RETENTION EVALUATION
PROGRAMS
Seth S. Andersen*
I. INTRODUCTION
Judicial retention evaluation programs are a key component of
efforts to make judicial retention elections more meaningful contests
for voters by providing objective, survey-based information on the
performance of judges standing for retention. Official judicial per-
formance evaluation programs for retention elections are currently in
use in six states: Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, New Mexico, Tennes-
see, and Utah. Alaska was the first state to adopt such a program in
1976.2 New Mexico's Judicial Performance Evaluation Program is
the newest, implemented by supreme court order in 1997.
3
While the current trend appears to favor adoption of official re-
tention evaluation programs in more states, it is important to note
* Former Director, Hunter Center for Judicial Selection, American Judi-
cature Society. Project Manager, Standing Committee on Judicial Independ-
ence, American Bar Association. This paper was prepared specifically for the
Summit on Improving Judicial Selection. The views expressed in this paper
are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views, opinions or po-
sitions of the National Center for State Courts, the American Bar Association,
the American Judicature Society, the Joyce Foundation, or the Open Society
Institute.
1. See UNCERTAIN JUSTICE: POLITICS IN AMERICA'S COURTS: THE
REPORTS OF THE TASK FORCES OF CITIZENS FOR INDEPENDENT COURTS 99
(2000), available at http://vw.constitutionprojectorg/ci/reports/uncertain_
justice.pdfo(ast visited Feb. 27,2001) [hereinafter UNCERTAIN JUSTICE].
2. See SARA MATHIAS, ELECTING JUSTICE: A HANDBOOK OF JUDICIAL
ELECTION REFORMS 20 (1990).
3. See Amended Order Establishing Judicial performance, N.M. Sup. Ct.
(1999); Order Establishing Judicial Performance, N.M. Sup. Ct. (1997); New
Mexico Judicial Performance Evaluation Commission, 2000 Voter Information
Guide, available at http://www.nmeourts.com/JPE.pdf (last visited Mar. 11,
2001) [hereinafter New Mexico Judicial Commission].
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that only six of the nineteen states that hold retention elections at
some or all levels of court have adopted such programs. 4 Concerns
about the fairness of survey methodologies and evaluation commis-
sion procedures, as well as a general reticence among many judges to
subject themselves to an evaluation process that may be seen as a
threat to decisional independence, have helped to stall the expansion
of retention evaluation programs.
5
This briefing paper will focus on official, state-sponsored, judi-
cial performance evaluation programs that are used to provide voters
with information and recommendations in retention elections. Bar
polls, and other types of judicial performance evaluation programs
that are conducted in many states, either solely for judicial self-
improvement purposes or to aid in the reappointment decisions of
governors or nominating commissions, do not fall within the scope
of this paper.
Judicial retention evaluation programs can be characterized as
having some common elements: official status; broad-based survey
mechanisms; wide dissemination of survey results and recommenda-
tions; and judicial self-improvement.
Funding for these judicial evaluation programs establishes their
official status. In contrast to judicial evaluation surveys that are con-
ducted by bar associations, interest groups, or other private entities,
the programs considered in this paper are established by law or court
order, and are funded through the legislature or the judicial branch.
In most instances, the members of judicial performance evaluation
commissions are appointed by elected officials and/or judges.
6
Official judicial retention evaluation programs utilize a broad-
based approach to surveying court users. Unlike bar association
polls, which by definition seek only the opinions of attorneys on ju-
dicial performance, judicial retention evaluation programs may also
include surveys of jurors, litigants, witnesses, court staff, police and
probation officers, social service personnel, and others who are in a
4. See UNCERTAIN JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 99.
5. See A. John Pelander, Judicial Performance Review in Arizona: Goals,
Practical Effects and Concerns, 30 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 643, 665 (1998) (discussing
judges' opposition to Arizona's judicial performance review pilot).
6. See id. at 669-70, 683.
7. See id. at 648.
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position to evaluate judicial performance! In addition, performance
evaluation commissions consider nonsurvey sources of information,
including personal interviews with the judges being evaluated, disci-
pline records, caseload evaluations, 9 and completion of continuing
judicial education requirements.
Official judicial retention evaluation programs strive for the
widest possible dissemination of results to voters. While some states
are restricted by limited resources, several states are able to send sur-
vey results and recommendations to all registered voters.' 0 More
detailed information on dissemination can be found in the "Program
Models" section of this paper.
Although the primary purpose of most judicial performance
evaluation programs is to provide voters in retention elections with
an objective source of information, all programs also include an im-
portant judicial self-improvement component through confidential
midterm evaluations and interviews with judges under evaluation.'I
The anonymity of survey responses also provides judges vith sys-
tematic and honest feedback on their performance that is seldom
forthcoming under normal circumstances.
Ir. RATIONALE BEHIND PROGRAMS
Judicial merit selection plans seek to strike a balance between
the often competing demands for both judicial independence and ac-
countability to the public by providing for initial appointment
through a nominating commission and subsequent terms through
noncompetitive retention elections. Retention elections provide ac-
countability in theory, but in practice they can suffer from the same
lack of publicity and voter interest as competitive judicial elections
often do. The starkest measure of voter interest in retention elections
is rolloff-the percentage of balloting voters who do not vote in the
retention election.'12 While the 1996 average rolloff percentage in
8. See UNCERTAIN JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 98-99.
9. See MATHIAS, supra note 2, at 21.
10. See Pelander, supra note 5, at 686 (discussing Arizona's distribution to
all voters in brochure, public service announcements, and direct mailings).
11. See id. at 650-51.
12. See Larry Aspin, Trends in Judicial Retention Elections, 1964-1998, 83
JuDIcATuRE 79, 81 (1999).
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retention elections was relatively high at 29.5%, this figure repre-
sents an improvement over the period between 1976 and 1984 when
average rolloff was 36%. 13 Moreover, the average affirmative vote
in retention elections stood at 75.8% in 1998, rebounding from a
historic average low of 69.4% in 1990.1
4
The flip side of increasing voter participation in retention elec-
tions and confidence in judges standing for retention is an increasing
lack of voter differentiation among judges on the same ballot. Voters
can and do, albeit extremely rarely, single out individual judges for
defeat, but analysis of average affirmative votes for all judges on the
same ballot shows that "within a district the typical judge's affirma-
tive vote differs very little from that of the other judges in the dis-
trict."'15 Judicial performance evaluation programs, therefore, can be
premised at least in part on the need to provide voters with more spe-
cific information on each judge. This will allow them to make indi-
vidualized decisions rather than voting all up or all down on multiple
retention candidates.
Official retention evaluation programs also seek to involve citi-
zens more directly in the process of evaluating judges. Members of
the public are involved in the evaluation process as commission
members and as respondents to evaluation surveys. By actively
seeking citizen input, it is hoped that voters will see official evalua-
tion information as reflecting their views, or their neighbors' views,
as well as attorneys' evaluations of judicial performance.
In addition to improving voter awareness and citizen involve-
ment, official retention evaluation programs can be effective count-
ers to biased or politically motivated judicial evaluations conducted
by interest groups seeking to rid the bench of judges they perceive to
be unfavorable to their issues. Among the most frequently cited in-
stances of successful "Vote No" campaigns led by interest groups are
the defeats of Justice Penny White of the Tennessee Supreme Court
and Justice David Lanphier of the Nebraska Supreme Court, both in
1996.16 In both instances, interest groups launched well-funded,
13. Seeid. at 81.
14. See id. at 79-80.
15. Id. at 81.
16. See Traciel V. Reid, The Politicization of Retention Elections: Lessons
from the Defeat of Justices Lanphier and White, 83 JUDICATuRE 68, 68 (1999).
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last-minute campaigns that focused voters' attention on single deci-
sions. Voters had no neutral performance evaluation to rely upon,
making Justices White and Lanphier all the more vulnerable to po-
litical attack.17 Had official performance evaluations been conducted
in Tennessee and in Nebraska in 1996, Justices White and Lanphier
may still have lost their retention bids, but they would have at least
been able to point to the results of independent, nonpolitical evalua-
tions. In addition, the existence of official performance evaluations
may reduce the necessity of fund-raising by judges who face organ-
ized opposition, especially in those states that disseminate evaluation
results widely.
As evaluation commissions are public and do not represent a
particular ideology or set of issues, they can help to focus voters' de-
cision making on "the commonly held value of a competent inde-
pendent judiciary, rather than on partisanship or ideology."'18 Infor-
mal (nonrandom) exit polls of retention election voters conducted by
the American Judicature Society in 1996 in four states with retention
evaluation programs found that official evaluation information has a
positive impact on the electorate in terms of increasing participation
in retention elections and influencing voting choices.' More fo-
cused study of voter behavior is needed, however, to determine
whether voters give more credence to official retention evaluation in-
formation than to interest group evaluations.
Stated goals of evaluation commissions differ from state to state,
but Arizona's Rules of Procedure for Judicial Performance Review
give the most comprehensive statement of commission goals. The
commission is to
assist voters in evaluating the performance of judges and
justices standing for retention; facilitate self-improvement
17. See id. at 69.
18. Kevin M. Esterling, Judicial Accountability the Right Way: Official
Performance Evaluations Help the Electorate as well as the Bench, 82
JuDIcATuRE 206, 215 (1999).
19. See id. at 210 (voters in Anchorage, Phoenix, Denver, and Salt Lake
City, were asked if the official evaluation information influenced their voting
choices (percent agreeing or strongly agreeing ranged from 59.8% in Anchor-
age to 81.6% in Denver), and if they were more likely to vote in a judicial
election because of the official evaluation information (percent agreeing or
strongly agreeing ranged from 64.6% in Anchorage to 72.0% in Denver)).
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of all judges and justices subject to retention; promote ap-
propriate judicial assignments; assist in identifying needed
judicial education programs; and otherwise generally pro-
mote the goals of judicial performance review, which are to
protect judicial independence while fostering public ac-
countability of the judiciary.20
III. PROGRAM MODELS
The following overview of retention evaluation commissions'
structure and procedures draws heavily on the results of a 1996-1997
American Judicature Society study of programs in Alaska, Arizona,
Colorado, and Utah.2 1 Additional information on newer retention
evaluation programs in New Mexico and Tennessee was collected
for the purpose of this briefing paper.
22
The six states currently using official retention evaluation pro-
grams share common goals, with some notable variations in proce-
dure. Tables describing evaluation procedures and performance cri-
teria are included below as an effective means of summarizing a vast
amount of commission-specific information.
Generally speaking, all commissions base their evaluations and
recommendations on both statistical and qualitative information from
a variety of sources. They conduct formal surveys of court users
23
and meet with judges to discuss evaluation results and self-
improvement goals. Several commissions also hold public hearings
or solicit public comment in writing.
Evaluation commissions generally send questionnaires only to
those attorneys who have appeared before the judge being evaluated,
in order to avoid evaluations that are based on second-hand informa-
tion or the overall reputation of the judge within the legal commu-
nity. If questionnaires are sent to all attorneys in a particular
20. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17B (West 2000) (Supreme Court of Arizona,
Rules of Procedure for Judicial Performance Review: Implementation of Ari-
zona Constitution Article 6(42) Proposition 109, Rule 1).
21. See KEViN M. EsTERLING & KATHLEEN M. SAMPSON, JUDICIAL
RETENTION EVALUATION PROGRAMS IN FOUR STATES: A REPORT WITH
RECOMMENDATIONS (1998).
22. See New Mexico Judicial Commission, supra note 3.
23. For information on groups surveyed in each state, see infra Table 1.
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jurisdiction, as is the case in Alaska, respondents must indicate their
level of direct professional experience with the judge being evalu-
ated.
TABLE 1: EVALUATION PROCEDURES2 4
Alaska Arizona Colorado New Tennessee
Mexicos (Appellate) Utah
Groups Alaska Bar Attor- Jurors, liti- Appellate Attomeys, Attoreys,
surveyed members; neys, gants, court level: court per- jurors
peace and litigants, personnel, Attorneys, sonnel,
probation wit- probation of- fellow ap- other op-
officers; nesses, ficers, social pellate pellate
court stafP, jurors, service and judges, trial judges, trial
jurors for last other law enforce- judges, law judges
2 years of judgesl ment person- clerks, staff
term justices, nel, crime attorneys,
court victims, attor- court per-
staff neys sonnel, law
professors
Nonsur- Judge's self- Judge's Caseload Judge's Judges' Compliance
vey evaluation; previous evaluation; self- self- with caser-
sources of legal, disci- self- interview with evaluation; reporting under-
informa- pline, health evalua- the judge interview form; advisemant
tion records; at- tions and with the caseloadf standard;
tomeys in 9- profes- judge work out- completion
12 major sional put data; of 30 hours
cases;judi- goals disclosure continuing
cial conduct of any dis- education
commission; ciplinary pryear;
conflict of actions of compliance
interest fll- Court of the with Code
ings Judiciary ofJudicial
I Conduct
24. Table 1 was adapted from Table I-3: Evaluation procedures from
ESTERLiNG & SAMPSON, supra note 21, at 27.
25. See New Mexico Judicial Commission, supra note 3. The New Mexico
Judicial Performance Evaluation Commission also evaluates trial court judges
seeking retention. Groups surveyed for trial court evaluations are: attorneys,
litigants, jurors, court personnel, adult and juvenile probation officers, social
service personnel, psychologists, bail bondsmen, court interpreters, citizen re-
view volunteers, Court Appointed Special Advocate (CASA) volunteers, and
law enforcement officers. Additional nonsurvey sources of information for
trial court evaluations include caseload evaluations and court observations, if
warranted. See id.
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New TennesseeAlaska Arizona Colorado Mexlco2 6  (Appellate) Utah
Public Hearings, Public Public hear- No Public No
input newspaper hearings; ings; public hearings;
ads and requests comment in public
PSAs en- for pub- writing comment
courage lic com- solicited
public corn- ment in through
ment writing Web page
Judge in- Council Factual Yes, after re- Yes, after Yes Judge may
terview .may" inter- report ceiving analy- receiving request
manda- view; draft must be sis of survey analysis of interview if
tory? results sent to results survey re- he or she
shared with judge; suits fails to
judge prior judge meet ccrti-
to final can fication
evaluation submit standards
meeting written
re-
sponse;
confer-
ence
team
inter-
views
Surveys of other court users, such as jurors, litigants, witnesses,
and court personnel, are generally distributed in court; respondents
are asked to mail their completed surveys to an independent data
center to ensure confidentiality throughout the evaluation process.
Commissions do not factor anonymous citizen comments in their
evaluation recommendations, but may provide such comments to
judges for their own use.
Retention evaluation commissions vary in their organizational
structure. Most commissions include lawyers, judges, and nonlaw-
yer members, although Colorado's commissions have no judge
26. See New Mexico Judicial Commission, supra note 3. The New Mexico
Judicial Performance Evaluation Commission also evaluates trial court judges
seeking retention. Groups surveyed for trial court evaluations are: attorneys,
litigants, jurors, court personnel, adult and juvenile probation officers, social
service personnel, psychologists, bail bondsmen, court interpreters, citizen re-
view volunteers, Court Appointed Special Advocate (CASA) volunteers, and
law enforcement officers. Additional nonsurvey sources of information for
trial court evaluations include caseload evaluations and court observations, if
warranted. See id.
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members. Commissions range in size from the seven members of
the Alaska Judicial Council-including three lawyers, three nonlaw-
yers, and the chiefjustice2 -- to the thirty-member Arizona Commis-
sion on Judicial Performance Review-including six lawyers, eight-
een nonlawyers, and six judges.29 Because all Colorado judges stand
for retention, the state has one statewide commission for the appel-
late levels and twenty-two district commissions for trial judges up for
retention in each district.30 All other states have a single retention
evaluation commission. In Alaska, Arizona, and Utah, lawyer mem-
bers of commissions are selected by state bar boards of governors.
In Arizona, for example, the supreme court selects from a list sub-
mitted by the Arizona Bar Board of Governors. The lawyer and
nonlawyer members of each Colorado commission, however, are ap-
pointed by the chief justice, the governor, the Speaker of the House,
and the president of the Senate. Nonlawyer members of commis-
sions are selected, with legislative confirmation, by the governor in
Alaska, by the supreme court in Arizona, and by a variety of elected
officeholders in New Mexico. Evaluation commissioners generally
have staggered terms, ranging from three to six years in length, and
must disqualify themselves if a conflict of interest arises in evaluat-
ing a particular judge.
31
The stated criteria used by evaluation commissions also varies
from state to state. New Mexico's Statewide Judicial Performance
Evaluation Program, for example, bases evaluations on fairness,
knowledge and understanding of the law, ability to communicate,
preparation and attentiveness, and effectiveness in working with
court personnel.32 Naturally, questionnaires sent to attorneys include
27. See Recommendations for Judicial Retention: November 7, 2000 Elec-
tion, available at http:l/vvw.cobar.org/judges/nov2000/ (last visited Mar. 6,
2001) [hereinafter Recommendations].
28. See Alaska Judicial Council: Membership, available at http/wwwv.ajc.
state.ak.us/AJCMEM.htm (last visited Feb. 26, 2001).
29. See Arizona Commission on Judicial Performance Review: Member-
ship, at http://supreme.state.az.us/jpr/JPRPublicMBRLIST-O1.PDF (updated
Feb. 15, 2001).
30. See Recommendations, supra note 27.
31. Information on commission membership is adapted from Table 111-2:
Commission membership found in ESTERLING & SAMPSON, supra note 21, at
24.
32. See New Mexico Judicial Commission, supra note 3.
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a greater number of questions relating to legal ability, whereas ques-
tionnaires sent to litigants, witnesses, or jurors focus more on issues
of integrity, judicial temperament, and administrative skills.
The Arizona Superior Court evaluation survey illustrates the dif-
ferent approaches used with different respondent groups. 33 Respon-
dents are asked to rate superior court judges on the following criteria:
"unacceptable," "poor," "satisfactory," "very good," "superior," and
"can't rate.' 34
Litigants, witnesses, jurors, and self-represented litigants rate
judges on the following criteria: integrity, communication skills, ju-
dicial temperament, and administrative performance. Integrity in-
cludes separate questions on equal treatment regardless of race, gen-
der, economic status, and basic fairness and impartiality.
Communication skills evaluate the candidates on whether their oral
communications are clear and logical. Judicial temperament looks at
the candidates' understanding and compassion, dignity, courteous-
ness, conduct promoting public confidence in the court, and ability.
Administrative performance includes punctuality in conducting pro-
ceedings, maintenance of control in courtroom, and work ethics. Ju-
rors who served are asked the questions above, with additional ques-
tions under communication skills, i.e., whether the candidate
explained proceedings, reasons for delays, jurors' responsibilities,
and gave clear instructions. Additionally, participants are asked in
what capacity they were a party to the trial-plaintiff, witness, etc.-
as well as race or ethnicity and gender. Finally, space is provided for
narrative comments.35
Attorneys who have appeared before the judge rate on the fol-
lowing criteria: legal ability, integrity, communication skills, judi-
cial temperament, administrative performance, and settlement activi-
ties. The legal ability category encompasses legal reasoning ability,
knowledge of substantive law, knowledge of rules of evidence,
knowledge of rules of procedure, knowledge of laws pertaining to
33. For further information on different approaches, see graphic on Arizona
superior court surveys adapted from ESTERLING & SAMPSON, supra note 21, at
88; see also Pelander, supra note 5, at 673-74 (comparing the attorney survey
from that used by other respondents).
34. See Pelander, supra note 5, at 673-74.
35. See ESTERLING & SAMPSON, supra note 21, at 88.
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sentencing, and ability to keep up to date. Integrity implies conduct
free from impropriety; separate questions on equal treatment regard-
less of race, gender, and economic status; avoiding prejudging out-
comes of cases; and basic fairness and impartiality. Communication
skills include clear and logical oral communications or directions,
and clearly and logically written decisions. Judicial temperament in-
cludes understanding and compassion, dignity, courteousness, con-
duct promoting public confidence in the court, and ability. In addi-
tion to the basis for rating administrative performance given to
litigants, witnesses, jurors, and self-represented litigants, attorneys
are asked to rate this category based on the candidates' promptness
in making rulings and rendering decisions, and their efficient man-
agement of the calendar. The settlement activities category includes
appropriate actions in encouraging settlement negotiations, promo-
tion of negotiation without coercion or threats, careful exploration of
the strengths and weaknesses of each party's case, mediation skills,
and credible settlement appraisals. Space is given for narrative
comments.36
Following the completion of the full evaluation process, com-
missions take a public vote to recommend or not recommend reten-
tion of each judge. Each state commission uses different language in
making recommendations, and some, such as Alaska, provide aggre-
gate numerical ratings of judges' survey results.37 Arizona has de-
veloped a unique "conference team" structure that allows each
evaluated judge to discuss evaluation results, whether negative or
positive and before they are publicly released, with a three-member
team that includes one nonlawyer, one lawyer, and one judge or jus-
tice. In meetings with conference teams, judges develop specific,
written performance improvement goals.
38
Finally, commissions face perhaps their most daunting task-
wide dissemination of evaluation results and recommendations to the
voting public to ensure the usefulness of the evaluation process.
Commissions in Alaska, Colorado, and Utah are able to mail evalua-
tion results directly to voters, generally as part of a larger voter
36. See id.; Pelander, supra note 5, at 673-74.
37. See Esterling, supra note 18, at 210-11.
38. Seeid. at212.
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information pamphlet mailed to all registered voters. Other states
rely on a host of methods for disseminating evaluation results, in-
cluding: Web pages; voter pamphlets made available at polling
places, libraries, banks, shopping centers, courts, bar offices, etc.;
newspaper coverage; public service announcements on television and
radio; and meetings with community groups.
39
Regardless of the professionalism and thoroughness of the
evaluation process, all can go for naught if adequate funds are not
available for widespread dissemination of results. Prior to 1998, for
instance, results of the Colorado Judicial Performance Evaluation
Program were not included in the lieutenant governor's voter infor-
mation guide that is mailed to all households. Despite the fact that
the Colorado commissions were able to disseminate approximately
600,000 copies of their own judicial retention voter guides in 1996,
widespread frustration with limited dissemination capabilities threat-
ened the viability of the evaluation program. 40 Colorado's experi-
ence should serve as a cautionary tale to other states-sufficient
funds for dissemination of results must be a precondition for estab-
lishing a retention evaluation program.
IV. VIEWS OF EVALUATION PROGRAMS
Generally, judicial retention evaluation programs are given high
marks by judges, evaluation commissioners, and voters. Significant
concerns exist, however, over the accuracy and fairness of evaluation
programs and the impact of evaluations on judicial independence.
Table 2 highlights a sampling of judges' key concerns regarding
commission methods, accuracy, and fairness.
39. See id. at 209.
40. See ESTERLING & SAMPSON, supra note 21, at 30.
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TABLE 2: COMMISSION METHODS, ACCURACY, AND FAIRNESS
4 1
Percent a in or stro Ply agming
Alaska Arizona Colorado Utah AlIjudgesStatement (__ _)* ( ) (N) (N) .NL
I have an adequate opportunity to 42.9 60.0 61.0 34.4 53.4
respond to commission results be- (7) (35) (59) (32) (133)
fore they are made public. ) (3) 9) (32) (133)
Judges have access to a fair appeals 20.0 51.6 30.2 30.8 35.7
process if they disagree with the (5) (31) (53) (26) (115)
commission's report. (5) (31) (5)_26_(15
The overall process used by the
evaluation commission to collect 66.7 66.7 60.7 57.6 62.0
information about my performance (9) (39) (61) (33) (142)
is fair.
The evaluation process undermines 22.2 33.3 14.5 50.0 28.2
my independence as a judge. (9) (39) (62) (32) (142)
* (N) denotes the number of people responding to the query.
The 50% of Utah judges surveyed who felt that the evaluation
process undermines judicial independence were primarily concerned
with the fact that, in 1996, the Utah Judicial Council surveyed only
attorneys.42 The addition of a juror survey in Utah in 1997 might
improve Utah judges' view of the process. But one cannot ignore the
fact that 28.2% of all judges surveyed in 1996 believed that the proc-
ess undermines judicial independence, even when multiple court user
groups are surveyed. Special attention should also be paid to judges'
concerns regarding evaluation methods and demands for a process to
appeal evaluation results. The problem of accuracy of results is most
magnified in rural areas, where only a handful of attorneys or law en-
forcement officers may return surveys. Clearly, the potential for
misleading evaluation results is high when an insufficient number of
surveys are returned or when one segment of the attorney population
is overrepresented. Judges also must feel that they have adequate
opportunities to address questionable or negative evaluation results.
Retention evaluation commissioners have also expressed con-
cerns about outside political pressures on the evaluation process. If a
commission has inadequate staff and funding, or finds itself
41. See ESTERLING & SAMPSON, supra note 21, at 30; interview with
Kathleen M. Sampson, director of the Hunter Center for Judicial Selection and
Seth Andersen, program manager, and director of the Colorado Judicial Per-
formance Evaluation Program in Denver, Colorado.
42. See ESTERLING & SAMPSON, supra note 21, at 30.
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defending the evaluation program from hostile legislation, its inde-
pendence and credibility can be threatened. Inadequate funding
compromises the most crucial element of an evaluation program-
methodologically sound and fair survey administration.
43
V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Based on its intensive study of retention evaluation programs in
four states, the American Judicature Society has offered the follow-
ing recommendations for ensuring the validity of evaluation pro-
grams:
1. Establish clear rules and procedures for the performance
evaluation process.
2. Provide adequate funding.
3. Develop clear, measurable performance standards.
4. When there is a sufficiently large pool of respondents, adopt
standard random sampling and appropriate follow-up proce-
dures when surveying court user groups.
5. Ensure confidentiality in surveys and in commission delib-
erations to promote candid responses by surveyed individu-
als and frank discussion among commissioners.
6. Establish strong self-improvement components of the per-
formance evaluation process.
7. Mandate a procedure for judges to receive and respond to
evaluation results before they are made public.
8. Establish an effective mechanism for disseminating evalua-
tion reports to the public.
9. Establish a mechanism to incorporate evaluation results in
designing judicial education programs.
10. Establish linkages with print media.
11. Leave the process open to amendment.
12. Establish training programs for all evaluation commission-
ers.
13. Involve the public in and educate them about the process.
44
43. See id. at215.
44. See ESTERLING & SAMPSON, supra note 21, at 117-21 (full text of rec-
ommendations).
1388
June 2001] JUDICIAL RETENTION EVALUATION 1389
Judicial retention evaluation programs that are designed and
conducted carefully can accrue many benefits to the judiciary and the
public. The anonymity of evaluation survey responses provides
more honest commentary and constructive criticism of job perform-
ance than judges normally receive. Voters in retention elections
benefit from an objective source of evaluative information. Finally,
the shared desire for some measure of judicial accountability to the
public expressed through the institution of retention elections is
given better definition through a process of evaluation that is based
on a well-defined set of nonpolitical performance criteria.
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